GOLDMAN
AND HIS CRITICS

EDITED BY BRIAN P. MCLAUGHLIN
AND HILARY KORNBLITH

WILEY Blackwell

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AND HIS CRITICS

PHILOSOPHERS AND THEIR CRITICS

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Edited by Brian P. McLaughlin and Hilary Kornblith

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Foreword

My first and foremost thanks for this volume go to the co-editors, Hilary Kornblith and Brian P. McLaughlin, who invested huge amounts of time and energy to this project, from conception to final execution. I have debts to each of them for many things over many years, but their work on this project exceeds everything that went before. To the authors of the volume's chapters I am also exceedingly grateful. I could not have imagined a more astute and incisive assemblage of critics. I very much appreciate the careful and thorough pieces of philosophy (and cognitive science, in some instances) that they collectively directed toward a wide range of my writings. It is possible that I originally misread the proposed volume's title. I thought it read "Goldman and His 'Critics'," with *scare quotes* around 'Critics.' So I wasn't initially prepared for the tough-minded seriousness of the critiques I encountered. Nonetheless, I pulled myself together and wrote replies with roughly comparable levels of seriousness; at any rate, as serious as could be mounted subject to my 1000-word limit per reply. Thanks for the workout, my friends.

Alvin I. Goldman (September, 2015)

Preface

This volume contains sixteen essays on Alvin Goldman's work and his replies to them. Many of the essays focus on Goldman's contributions to epistemology, both individual and social. Others deal with his important contributions to philosophy of cognitive science, philosophy of mind – especially simulation theory – and metaphysics. It is difficult to contain the range of Goldman's interests and contributions within the covers of a single volume.

Goldman's contributions to epistemology, beginning almost fifty years ago with "A Causal Theory of Knowing" (1967), completely changed the field. His externalism brought about a paradigm shift in epistemological theorizing from the centrality of the would-be knower's perspective to a third-person view of the features in virtue of which a belief is justified. Part and parcel of this shift was a move away from what Goldman called a "current time slice view" of justification, according to which the justificational status of a belief at a given time depends exclusively on features of the believer at that time, in favor of a historical theory of justification, which makes a belief's justificatory status depend on features of its causal ancestry. Goldman has elaborated and defended this externalist view in ever greater detail and depth over the years, and the debate between externalists and internalists continues to be a focus of discussion in the epistemological literature. It is thus appropriate that a number of papers here are addressed to that issue.

Once one adopts an externalist approach to epistemological issues, the exclusive focus on features of individual knowers that had been so prevalent within the epistemological literature begins to look misguided. Much that goes on within individuals is, to be sure, relevant to epistemological concerns. But features of the social environment are ripe for epistemological analysis as well, and, especially beginning with *Knowledge in a Social World* (1999), Goldman has played a crucial role not only in highlighting the importance of these social features, but in developing a full-scale social epistemology. These concerns are reflected in a number of the contributions to this volume.

Goldman's work in philosophy of mind and cognitive science rightly receive attention here as well. Goldman gave one of the earliest articulations and defenses of the simulation account of self-knowledge, a view he presented most fully in *Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading* (2006), and which he further

elaborated in the papers collected in *Joint Ventures: Mindreading, Mirroring, and Embodied Cognition* (2013).

Finally, Goldman's work in metaphysics, influenced, as so much of his work is, by results in the cognitive sciences, is also the focus of attention here.

Throughout his career, Goldman's work has been a model of interdisciplinary research and of scientifically informed philosophy. He has co-authored work not only with other philosophers, but with economists, psychologists, neuroscientists, and lawyers. The breadth of his vision, the care and clarity with which he has worked out his ideas, the originality and scope of his views, have all contributed to the importance of his work. Goldman's evident pleasure in interacting with other researchers, and the tremendous contributions he has made by way of those interactions, can be seen here in his replies to the contributors to this volume. We have all profited from these interactions over many years, and it is our pleasure that this volume should serve as a token of our appreciation for Goldman's many seminal contributions.

We would like to thank Sam Carter for his help with editorial work and for preparing the index.

Part I

Reliabilism, Internalism, and Externalism

1

Internalism, Reliabilism, and Deontology

MICHAEL WILLIAMS

1 Internalism and the Reliabilist Revolution

Since the 1960s, Anglophone epistemology has undergone a paradigm-shift: "the Reliabilist Revolution." The revolutionary-in-chief has been Alvin Goldman.

Reliabilism names a family of views. According to Goldman's version, knowledge is true belief acquired and sustained by some reliable cognitive process or procedure: that is, a process or procedure that tends to produce true beliefs and to avoid producing false ones. Other versions avoid the reference to cognitive processes or procedures and equate knowledge with true belief that in some appropriate way counterfactually co-varies with the facts: for example, had it not been the case that *p*, I would not have believed that *p* ("sensitivity"), or that in believing that *p* I could not easily have gone wrong ("safety")[i]. I won't be concerned with whether one approach is superior. Nor will I investigate the best way to formulate either.

Rather, my focus will be on a central element in all versions: the shift from an "internalist" to an "externalist" approach to understanding knowledge and justification. Goldman's assessment of "internalism" is negative in the extreme. He argues not merely that his "externalist" understanding of knowledge is superior to any "internalist" rival but that internalism suffers from crippling defects: "fundamental problems that lie at the core of internalism." Further, he claims to have challenged "the viability of [internalism's] most prominent rationale" (Goldman 1999 [2002]: 3).[ii] He finds this putative rationale in what he calls the *guidance-deontological* ("GD") approach to justification, according to which justification depends on self-consciously living up to one's epistemic obligations. As Goldman notes, the GD approach has a long history. Arguably, it was the dominant approach prior to the Reliabilist Revolution: hardly surprising, given that in the pre-revolutionary era

Goldman and His Critics, First Edition. Edited by Brian P. McLaughlin and Hilary Kornblith.

virtually all epistemologists were internalists of one kind or another.[iii] Indeed, there is a case for saying that the internalist/externalist contrast itself – or at least a clear awareness of its importance – is a product of the Revolution, though we would have to add that how the distinction is best understood is a matter of debate.

I agree that "internalism," *as Goldman understands it*, should be repudiated. But as Goldman recognizes, the GD approach to understanding knowledge and justification does not, in and of itself, require us to adopt the kind of internalism he rejects. So I shall argue for two lemmas. The first is that Goldman has not adequately diagnosed the sources of the untenable internalism that is his principal target: additional commitments must be brought to light. The second is that dispensing with these commitments opens the way to an approach to knowledge and justification that is "internalist" by a standard that Goldman himself recognizes, yet free of the drawbacks he brings to our attention. My conclusion is that internalist justification needs refinement, not rejection. This means, in turn, that the GD conception of justification also survives.

2 Internalism's Burdens

According to Goldman, the distinction between an "externalist" and an "internalist" conception of justification turns on contrasting answers to the question of whether or not justification-conferring properties must be accessible to the subject. He writes:

> Externalism characteristically holds that beliefs acquire justificational status if they are produced by methods with certain "external" properties, properties that need not be known – and perhaps need not be knowable, or at any rate "directly" knowable – by the agent himself. Internalism takes issue with this claim about proper methods or pathways. It holds that all justification-conferring properties ("justifiers," for short) must be accessible to the agent. (*PK*: vii)

However, although we might reasonably take insistence on the "accessibility" of justifiers to be the essential feature of internalism, in doing so we would fall short of characterizing internalism as Goldman understands it. For Goldman, internalism is not just the view that justifiers be knowable. There is the further requirement that "only internal conditions qualify as legitimate determiners of justification," so that "justification must be a purely internal affair" (*PK*: 3) "Internal" here means "internal to the subject": justifiers, at least in the first instance, are *mental states* (or facts concerning such states). The "internalism" that Goldman repudiates is *subjectivist* internalism.

Goldman is surely right that subjectivist internalism has enjoyed a long run in epistemology; and he argues convincingly that its run deserves to come to an end. He advances three major conclusions:

1 *Internalism leads to skepticism.* In its strong form, internalism restricts legitimate justifiers so severely that beliefs that intuitively count as justified turn out to be unjustified. Attempts to liberalize internalism do not repair the damage.

2 *Internalism incorporates an untenable methodology of epistemology.* Internalism "standardly incorporates the doctrine that epistemology is a purely *a priori* or armchair enterprise rather than one that needs help from empirical science." However, the hallmark of epistemic justification is truth-conduciveness; and the truth-conduciveness of the procedure of guiding one's beliefs by internal states is an empirical matter. (We have learned that some of our natural ways of thinking are not always truth-reliable.)
3 *Internalism lacks a cogent rationale*. The main (only?) rationale for internalism derives from the GD conception of justification. But in itself, the GD conception does not support internalism. Goldman calls this the "core dilemma" for the "Three Step Argument" for internalism (*PK*: 17–18).

There is something to each of these points, though not as much as Goldman claims.

On the first point, I agree that many traditional forms of internalism lead to skepticism. So I can deal briefly with Goldman's arguments to that effect.

Internalism, as Goldman understands it, confines justifiers to facts concerning mental states. "Strong Internalism" (SI) is even more demanding, restricting justifiers to facts about *occurrent, conscious* mental states. Thus:

> (SI) Only facts concerning what conscious states an agent is in at time *t* are justifiers of the agent's beliefs at *t*. (*PK*: 8)

Strong Internalism is no straw man. As Goldman says, Chisholm – surely one of the most influential American epistemologists of the last century – says many things that commit him to such a view.[iv]

Strong Internalism falls to *the problem of stored beliefs*. Most of one's beliefs are stored in memory; and even when a belief is consciously entertained, it does not come accompanied by all beliefs relevant to its status as a justifier for other beliefs. Given Strong Internalism, then, almost none of our beliefs is justified. Internalists might reply that justification for a belief requires only a disposition to *generate* conscious evidential states as justifiers for consciously entertained beliefs. However, it is doubtful whether a Strong Internalist can accept this suggestion. The fact of possessing a disposition is not the sort of thing that can be known at an instant by introspection. Allowing dispositions to count as justifiers threatens to open the door to externalism.

Suppose that we liberalize internalism by expanding the class of justifiers to incorporate stored mental states: this Weak Internalism falls to *the problem of forgotten evidence*. We do not normally suppose that for a belief to remain justified I must be able to recall all the evidence or reasons that justified it at the time of acquisition, and imposing such a requirement would have extensive, skeptical implications. As Goldman says, a belief can be justified (and in the absence of countervailing considerations remain justified) by virtue of being acquired in an epistemically proper way. But "past acquisition is irrelevant by the lights of internalism," strong or weak, since all past events are "external" to an agent's current mental states and capacities (*PK*: 10).

Internalism has been defended in both foundationalist and coherentist versions. However, both versions make appeal to logical or probabilistic relations, either to connect

basic with non-basic beliefs or to contribute to the coherence of one's overall belief system. Since such relations do not concern either occurrent or stored mental states, it is unclear how internalists are entitled to count them as justifiers.

A further liberalization seems called for: we must credit an agent with some computational capacities that allow him to determine whether a targeted proposition stands in appropriate logical or probabilistic relations to other relevant belief-states. But now we face *the problem of the doxastic decision interval*. Suppose that one's belief-system contains 138 atomic propositions: just checking for consistency, using the truth table method and employing an ideal computer working at top speed, would take 20 billion years, which makes nonsense of the idea of being justified at a time. Furthermore, algorithms like the truth-table method are not in the conscious repertoire of most human beings: does this mean that most people have no justified beliefs? No doubt we have sub-personal computational skills and procedures that are reliable enough in ordinary circumstances. But the possession of such skills is precisely the kind of external fact that internalists exclude from justificational relevance. Not surprisingly: what skills we possess, and how reliable they are, are manifestly empirical matters.

Finally, there is the question of whether the class of justifiers should include epistemic principles. Goldman argues that it should: "epistemic principles are among the items that determine whether a belief is justified, which is just how 'justifiers' was defined" (*PK*: 16). But internalists have a special reason for so treating them. The rationale for internalism rests on the GD conception of justification, according to which justification depends on fulfilling one's epistemic obligations; and an agent's knowledge of her internal states "will not instruct her about her epistemic duties and entitlements unless she also knows true epistemic principles" (*PK*: 16). Unfortunately for internalists, it is doubtful whether ordinary agents are capable of formulating and recognizing such principles. Even professional epistemologists, who have made formulating epistemic principles their business, have never reached consensus. It seems that no such principles are known to *anyone*. By internalist standards, most people – possibly all people – know nothing whatsoever.

These are fair points. But what should we learn from them? That there is *nothing* to internalism? That the GD conception should be rejected *as such*? "No" to both questions.

3 Goldman's Incomplete Diagnosis

We saw that Goldman distinguishes internalism from externalism in two ways. One way invokes contrasting answers to the question of whether justifiers must be knowable by the subject, internalists saying "yes" and externalists "no." The other appeals to a difference in the factors that the two schools of thought are willing to count as justifiers. Internalists restrict justifiers to the subject's "internal" states, whereas externalists countenance justifiers involving relations to "external" – that is, extra-mental – conditions. Adding the second "internalist" requirement to the first yields a form of internalism – subjectivist internalism – that has attracted influential advocates. But so far, we have seen no reason to suppose that this addition is mandatory or even well-motivated.

Now in Goldman's view, these two ways of drawing the internalist/externalist distinction are closely related, at least in the minds of internalists. Adopting the GD conception of justification leads internalists to impose the knowability constraint, which they then take to require treating justification as an "internal" affair. Thus:

1 The GD conception of justification is posited.
2 A certain constraint on the determiners of justification is derived from the GD conception, that is, the constraint that all justification determiners must be accessible to, or knowable by, the epistemic agent.
3 The accessibility or knowability constraint is taken to imply that only internal conditions qualify as legitimate determiners of justification. So justification must be a purely internal affair.

This is the rationale for internalism that Goldman claims to undermine and which he calls "The Three Step Argument" for internalism. However, baldly stated, the Three Step Argument doesn't get us anywhere. We can agree that the GD conception mandates some kind of knowability constraint: that justifiers be knowable is the essential feature of internalism, according to Goldman's initial characterization. Our question was why the knowability constraint should be thought to restrict justifiers to internal states. The Three Step Argument takes this further step, but without explaining why.

We need to look more closely at the knowability constraint on justifiers. Here is Goldman's initial formulation:

> (KJ) The only facts that qualify as justifiers of an agent's believing *p* at time *t* are facts that the agent can readily know, at t, to obtain or not to obtain.

(KJ) is supposed to follow from the GD conception, on the grounds that we cannot guide assent by inaccessible factors. But even allowing that (KJ) follows from the GD conception – something we shall find reason to question – we have been given no reason to suppose that external justifiers cannot meet it. Goldman recognizes this, noting that internalists impose the stronger condition:

> (KJ_{dir}) The only facts that qualify as justifiers of an agent's believing *p* at time *t* are facts that the agent can readily know *directly*, at *t*, to obtain or not to obtain. (Goldman 1999: 277)

Again, we have to ask "Why?" Goldman's answer is that tacit recognition of the insufficiency of (KJ) is what "undoubtedly" leads internalists to favor the "direct knowability" constraint. The problem they then face is that this more restrictive knowability constraint is not mandated by the GD conception. This means that, even if (KJ) follows from the GD conception, we have no argument for internalism. Internalism, as Goldman construes it, depends on (KJ_{dir}), and (KJ_{dir}) does not follow from the GD conception. This is the "core dilemma" for the Three Step Argument, thus for internalism itself (unless internalism has some alternative rationale).

Goldman is right to point out that *subjectivist* internalism does not follow from (KJ), and so does not follow from the GD conception. He is also correct in noting that proponents of the GD conception often do restrict justifiers to "internal" states of the knower, such as perceptual appearings or ostensible memories, characterizing such states in ways that make no reference to "external" (extra-mental or environmental) conditions. Typically, they also embrace the view that the epistemic principles that guide us in forming and retaining our beliefs – for example, those linking our basic evidence with beliefs about the world around us – must be discoverable a priori, by reflection alone. But while Goldman is right that internalists often *do* take on these commitments, he falls short when it comes to explaining *why*. Goldman claims that internalists substitute (KJ_{dir}) for (KJ) because they recognize that the latter is too weak to support their subjectivism, or as Goldman would have it "internalism." But if this is so, they must *already* be inclined to take their internalism in a subjectivist direction. Unless this inclination is wholly unmotivated – which seems unlikely – considerations beyond the GD conception must be in play.

Goldman senses this problem, which is why he claims that recognition, on the part of subjectivist internalists, that (KJ) is not fit for the purpose is "tacit." But this is simply false: internalists of the traditional kind have *reasons* for preferring (KJ_{dir}). Goldman's diagnostic argument is incomplete because these reasons do not figure in his *exposé* of internalism. We must bring them into the open. Neutralizing them is the key to developing a non-subjectivist epistemology that takes guidance by reasons to play an essential role in epistemic justification. Such an epistemology will be internalist, according to Goldman's initial characterization of internalism, but not vulnerable to his criticisms.

4 The Roots of Subjectivism

Let us agree that the GD conception imposes some kind of knowability constraint on justifiers. (We will examine just what kind of knowability constraint later.) Let us further agree that any approach to justification that imposes such a constraint is *generically* internalist. The question is: what considerations push generic internalism towards subjectivism?

The aim of epistemology is to understand knowledge and justification.[v] But what kind of explanation are we looking for? Much traditional epistemology has sought what we can call a *vindicating* explanation: in Kant's famous terms, an answer to *Quid juris?* and not merely to *Quid facti?* So understood, the task of epistemology is not to record what, as a matter of fact, we believe, but rather to explain in some general way how we are entitled to hold the beliefs we do. Or to put the point another way, why at least some of our beliefs amount to knowledge rather than mere opinion. In this spirit, it is sometimes said that the task of epistemology is to show how knowledge is possible, given that it is possible. However, we only understand the task of showing how knowledge is possible because there are seemingly plausible arguments – skeptical arguments – for the conclusion that knowledge is *impossible*. If epistemology is supposed to provide a general vindication of our pretension to know things about the world around us, responding to skepticism becomes a controlling aim of epistemological theory.

In tracing the path to subjectivism, we must begin with the skepticism that arises from the supposed threat of an infinite regress of justification, or as I like to say from *Agrippa's Trilemma*. I make a claim. The skeptic (who may just be me in a reflective frame of mind) asks "How do you know (or why do you believe) that?" I explain, perhaps by citing some evidence, or giving my credentials: it doesn't matter. The skeptic then reiterates his question: "How do you know *that*?" Three possibilities emerge. I can:

1 keep responding by finding something new to say, in which case I embark on a vicious infinite regress; or
2 at some point, refuse to answer, in which case my "knowledge" rests on a mere assumption; or
3 recur to something I have already said, in which case my reasoning is circular.

In no case do I explain how I know. Seeing no fourth option, the skeptic concludes that knowledge (or justification) is impossible.

Granting that there is no fourth option, while holding that knowledge is nevertheless possible, the constructive epistemologist must argue that we can put a better face on one of the options the skeptic dismisses. Since most philosophers (and as far as I know all proponents of the GD conception) agree that an infinite regress of justifiers is a non-starter,[vi] taking the Agrippan problem at face value forces a choice between two broad strategies. The foundationalist strategy is to argue that there are basic beliefs: beliefs that are justified in a way that involves no dependence on further reasons. The coherentist strategy is to maintain that the charge of circularity rests on a misguided "linear" conception of justification, according to which a justified belief derives it positive status from prior beliefs in some chain of justification. In fact, justification is an emergent property of belief-systems, arising from complex interrelations (explanatory, probabilistic, etc.) among their elements. An individual belief is justified by virtue of being an element in such a system.[vii]

As Goldman notes, the kind of internalism he objects to can be found in both camps. However, for traditionally minded adherents of the GD conception, foundationalism has been the option of choice. This is not surprising. Assessing one's total belief-system for coherence is no easy task, if it is possible at all. So I shall focus on the route from foundationalism to subjectivism, though I think that comparable considerations apply to coherentism too.

Now while subjectivist internalists are committed to *substantive* anti-skepticism, *methodological* skepticism is built into their project of "showing how knowledge is possible." Chisholm's approach to epistemology is a perfect illustration. Chisholm investigates the justification for our everyday beliefs by way of "Socratic" questioning: that is, starting from everyday beliefs of some broad kind, such as beliefs concerning objects and events in our immediate environment, he reiterates the demand for justification until he finds facts that are "directly evident." Commitment to (KJ_{dir}) arises from the need to find regress stoppers: facts that can be directly – that is, non-inferentially – known. Traditional foundationalists are explicit about this. *Pace* Goldman, there is nothing tacit about their commitment to justifiers that are directly known.

While this is the first piece of the puzzle concerning the grounds for advancing (KJ_{dir}) in preference to the generic (KJ), it cannot be the whole story. Subjectivist internalists think that the basic beliefs that bring the regress of justification to a halt are not merely non-inferentially justified (in some sense of "non-inferentially") but *intrinsically credible*. This is a strong demand, which everyday beliefs about things around us do not evidently meet, even though they might well be thought to be non-inferential. Why the quest for beliefs that are non-inferentially justified turns into a quest for beliefs that are intrinsically credible is not immediately clear. As Goldman remarks, externalist-reliabilists have a perfectly good account of basic non-inferential knowledge: it is true belief arising directly from the exercise of a reliable cognitive capacity. But since perception is such a capacity, we have been given no reason to exclude facts about objects and events in the world around us from the category of facts that may be known non-inferentially to obtain. It follows that even (KJ_{dir}) is insufficient to enforce subjectivist internalism.

If this is right, the transition to subjectivism must involve further commitments. What might these be? One plausible candidate is *evidentialism*:

(E) It is one's epistemic duty, always and everywhere, to guide assent by evidence.

Since the evidence for our beliefs about the world around us is provided by perceptual experience, we may seem to have taken a step towards subjectivism. But we are not yet there. Externalist reliabilists can grant that beliefs about things around us are causally mediated, and in that sense guided, by perceptual experience. The guidance by evidence that (E) demands cannot be merely causal.

We saw at the outset that all forms of internalism, in so far as they are derived from the GD conception, are committed to some measure of epistemic self-consciousness in the regulation of assent. We should make this commitment explicit:

(E_{sc}) It is one's epistemic duty, always and everywhere, to self-consciously guide assent by evidence.

Applying (E_{sc}) to the guidance of beliefs about the world by experience, puts us well on the way to the subjectivist internalism Goldman deplores. But why should we think that (E_{sc}) applies always and everywhere? In particular, why should we not think that basic non-inferential knowledge is just the kind of knowledge that (E_{sc}) does not apply to? And if we take the existence of basic, non-inferential knowledge to preclude (E_{sc})'s being universally applicable, what is the barrier to accepting that externalist reliabilism offers the simplest and most plausible account of such knowledge? If there is no such barrier, there will be no reason to confine non-inferential knowledge to knowledge of "internal states". Such knowledge can concern how things are in the world around us, which is how we ordinarily understand it.[viii]

There is reason for proponents to the GD conception to reject this line of thought. Once we admit that we cannot sensibly insist on applying (E_{sc}) to basic non-inferential knowledge, it is not clear why we should insist on applying it to all *non*-basic knowledge. Indeed, the considerations Goldman calls attention to are powerful reasons for not doing

so. This is not to say that we do not sometimes self-consciously guide assent by attending to evidence. It is, however, to concede that such self-conscious belief management is not, and realistically could not be, the rule.

This is a serious worry concerning the GD conception in general, thus not specific to subjectivist internalism. However, I want to set it aside for the moment, since there is a deeper reason why subjectivist internalists – we might say traditional epistemologists – resist externalist-reliabilism. This is that it does not seem to them to offer *a* vindicating explanation of knowledge (or justification) *at the right level of generality*. The traditional epistemologist is seeking an explanation of how it is possible for us to know (or be justified in believing) *anything whatsoever*, or perhaps anything whatsoever in certain very broad categories: facts about the external world, for example. Arguably, an externalist-reliabilist account of our commonsense and scientific knowledge of the world fails to provide the vindicating explanation that the traditional epistemologist requires, since it offers an explanation of how knowledge and justified belief arise from within the very picture of the world and our place in it that stands in need of vindication.

Spelled out, the objection is that to answer the traditional epistemologist's skeptically driven question in externalist-reliabilist terms is to fall into some form of epistemic circularity. Underwriting this concern is commitment to what is sometimes called the *Principle of the Criterion* (PC). Ernest Sosa formulates the Principle as follows:

> (PC) Knowledge is enhanced by justified trust in the reliability of its sources. (Sosa 2009: 139)

Some sources of knowledge are derivative: we can justify our trust in them by evidence from other sources. But surely some sources of knowledge – perception and memory, for example – are *fundamental*: we can justify our trust in such sources of knowledge only by relying on those very sources. The question immediately arises: how can such trust be explained in a way that avoids epistemic circularity? Sosa calls this "The Pyrrhonian Problematic" (Sosa 2009: esp. chs 7– 9).[ix] The problem is to stop the regress of justification without courting even epistemic circularity. According to subjectivist internalists, this is a problem that externalist-reliabilist accounts of basic knowledge cannot solve.

Sosa argues that this is not so. Externalists can solve the problem by distinguishing *two grades* of knowledge, which he calls "animal" and "reflective" (Sosa 2009: ch 7). Animal knowledge is to be understood in externalist-reliabilist terms. Sosa argues for a version of Virtue Reliabilism, but the details don't matter here. The vital point is that the existence of some such primitive kind of knowledge ensures that some of our beliefs have a measure of justification, a positive epistemic standing, that does not depend on our having justified trust in their sources. By virtue of its positive standing, animal knowledge can provide a basis on which to construct a justified picture of the world and our place in it that explains why and to what extent the fundamental cognitive capacities that give rise to animal knowledge are indeed trustworthy. Starting from knowledge that is merely animal, we rise to the level of *reflective* knowledge. In so doing, we acquire the general vindicating understanding of our epistemic capacities that epistemology has always sought. We can *come to* satisfy the Principle of the Criterion without having always already satisfied it.

This is a powerful and intriguing response to the Pyrrhonian Problematic. But it works only because Sosa's version of the Principle of the Criterion is, by traditional standards, rather weak. (PC) asserts only that knowledge is *enhanced* by justified trust in its sources. But much traditional epistemology has embraced, if only implicitly, the *Strong Principle of the Criterion*:

(SPC) Knowledge *requires* justified trust in the reliability of its sources.

(SPC) precludes understanding *any* knowledge in *purely* externalist-reliabilist terms. This prohibition on invoking a reliabilist account of positive epistemic status is not only in force if we set non-inferential knowledge at the level of beliefs about the external world: it applies equally well to our experiential beliefs (or to whatever kind of belief-like awareness we might suppose to be involved in perceptual or memorial experience itself). In the context of methodological skepticism and under the twin constraints of (E_{sc}) and (SPC), the demand for regress stoppers turns into the demand for knowledge that is *absolutely* non-inferential. Such knowledge must be encapsulated: the states of awareness that give rise to it cannot owe their epistemic standing to any presuppositions regarding facts external to themselves. In other words, basic beliefs must be intrinisically credible.

As we saw, even (KJ_{dir}) is too weak to lead us to subjectivist internalism, if "direct" means no more than "non-inferential." What the subjectivist internalist really needs – and feels obliged to impose – is:

(KJ_{ani}) The only facts that qualify as justifiers of an agent's believing *p* at time *t* are facts that the agent can readily know *absolutely non-inferentially*, at *t*, to obtain or not to obtain.

On this conception of basic knowledge, the facts that give rise to it must involve self-presenting states. Such states constitute *self-vindicating sources of evidence*. Subjectivism now follows because beliefs concerning one's own internal states are the only remotely plausible candidates for this kind of epistemic privilege (at least for empirical knowledge). Only with respect to internal, psychological states is there the faintest plausibility to the claim that *being* in such a state is sufficient for *knowing* that one is.

Of course, whatever its merits as a response to the Agrippan (regress) problem, restricting basic knowledge to knowledge of one's internal states leads straight to the standard array of "Cartesian" skeptical problems. Thus restricted, our basic knowledge appears to seriously underdetermine what we may justifiably believe about "external" matters. If perceptual experience yields "direct" knowledge only of how thing appear to me, and if the course of my experience could be just what it has been even if I were the victim of Descartes' Evil Deceiver or a brain in a vat, then how am I justified in believing anything at all about the external world? If basic knowledge concerns "internal," states but we nevertheless have knowledge of "external" matters, there *must* be epistemic principles linking basic with non-basic knowledge. Such principles must be available to reflect on and justified a priori. But as Goldman rightly complains, such principles are problematic from the standpoint of the GD conception. People who lack the vocabulary even to formulate them – just about everyone who isn't a professional epistemologist – cannot self-consciously guide assent in the light of them. But as already noted, not even epistemologists know whether any such principles are even true.

Summing up, the roots of subjectivist internalism lie in a particular conception of the task of epistemology: showing how knowledge is possible, under the twin constraints of (E_{sc}) and (SPC). It is far from evident that the GD conception of justification commits us to these requirements.

5 Defending the GD Conception

Whatever reliabilists think, no adequate account of *human* knowledge can steer clear of deontological considerations. The reason is that the status of epistemic subject is essentially connected with *accountability*. To be an epistemic subject just *is* being accountable for what one believes, in the way that being an agent just *is* being accountable for what one does. Despite affinities and continuities, human knowledge differs from animal cognition in the way that human action differs from animal behavior. To be justified (or knowledgeable) in one's beliefs is to be *epistemically entitled* to them, thus licensed to use them in reasoning, to pass them on to others, and so on. To be knowledgeable is to be onside in the game of assertion. And as in soccer, the sanctions associated with an infringement of the rules are internal. If a subject turns out not to be knowledgeable with respect to a certain proposition, the assertional license that he has been (mistakenly) granted, or that he has taken himself to possess, lapses. This is what epistemic accountability amounts to.

Seen in this light, neither knowledge nor justified belief is straightforwardly a "mental state." If we want to talk about knowledge as a mental state, we must recognize that it is a mental state that is not only factive but implies a distinctive deontic status. To occupy this status – to be knowledgeable – a subject must satisfy two desiderata. The first is *due diligence* or *epistemically responsible belief-management*. The antonym of "responsible" is "irresponsible." (Epistemic accountability might also be called "epistemic responsibility," but here the sense of "responsible" would be quite different. Here the antonym of "responsible" – if there is one – would be "non-responsible.") The second desideratum is that a subject's epistemic procedure – the method or process that formed and sustains his belief – must be suitably reliable. The first condition on knowledge (and justification) is stated in deontological terms; the second is not. But the two desiderata are intimately connected. One obvious connection is that due diligence is a desideratum by virtue of promoting reliability. Reliabilists are right about this, though there is more to be said.[x, xi]

So far, I have said nothing about the role of reasons or evidence in producing or sustaining entitlement. But there must be some connection. To be accountable for one's beliefs is to be liable to be *held to account* for them. Accountable beings must therefore have the capacity to account for themselves: that is, possessors of epistemic entitlement must be capable of establishing or defending such entitlement. This is an "internalist" demand, according to Goldman's initial definition, which requires that subjects have some access to justifiers. If we accept it, three further demands follow immediately:

1 In so far as knowledge and justification require adherence to *proper standards* of epistemic conduct, adhering to those standards must involve more than *conforming* to them: it must involve (in some way) *recognizing* or *being guided* by them.

2 Being justified in one's beliefs must have an essential connection with the practice of justifying them. Being justified will involve the capacity to explain how and why one believes as one does.
3 Since vindicating a claim to knowledge often involves giving one's credentials – e.g. appealing to the reliability of one's recognitional capacities – epistemic subjects must not only *possess* reliable cognitive capacities, they must *know something* about how reliable those capacities are.

These requirements tie knowledge (and justification) to *epistemic self-consciousness*. Without epistemic self-consciousness, there is no epistemic accountability; and beings that are not accountable for their beliefs are not epistemic subjects in the way that mature human beings are. They are not beings that can be justified or unjustified in their beliefs, if they can be said to have *beliefs* at all.

How does this approach to understanding knowledge and justification avoid the slide into subjectivism? To insist that subjects not only *be* reliable with respect to certain epistemic procedures or processes, but also *know* about the reliability of these procedures or processes, is to impose (SPC). Aren't we therefore back in the Pyrrhonian Problematic, so that Goldman is right after all? Mustn't we choose between subjectivist internalism and externalist reliabilism? No. As we saw, the sources of subjectivism involve more than (SPC), thus epistemic self-consciousness. They impose (SPC) *in the context of methodological skepticism*. But it should not be assumed that giving a straightforward answer to the skeptic is epistemology's first order of business. We should also keep in mind the subjectivist internalist's commitment to (E_{sc}). We have seen no reason to think that the demand for epistemic self-consciousness entails a commitment to this particular conception of evidential guidance.

When does justification demand the possession and proper use of reasons or evidence? This question concerns the role of reason-giving in epistemically responsible belief-management. This role is more specialized than has generally been recognized: Goldman is right to complain that subjectivist internalism – which is most traditional internalism – vastly overstates the extent to which being justified depends on possessing and making appropriate use of reasons and evidence. In effect, to the question "When, where, and for whom are reasons required, if believing is to count as epistemically responsible?" (E_{sc}) answers "Always, everywhere and for everyone."[xii] On this view, what Sellars calls "the logical space of reasons" (1997: 76) conforms to what I have called a *Prior Grounding Structure (PGS)*:

> (PGS) In all epistemic contexts, epistemic assertional entitlement always derives, in whole or in part, from something positive that a claimant has *done* to earn it. A claimant's commitment must have been reached by the proper use of evidence, or *via* some appropriately reliable process, which he knows and can show to be reliable.

Commitment to (PGS) drives the Agrippan argument. Given (SPC) it threatens to ensnare us in the Pyrrhonian Problematic. But (PGS) imposes a severe *Claimant-Questioner Asymmetry* (CQA)with respect to the right to question and the obligation to respond.

(CQA) If I represent myself as knowing (or justifiedly believing) that *p*, there is nothing a questioner has to do, no special position a questioner has to be in, and no way that things have to be, in order for someone to have the right to raise an epistemic question: i.e. to ask me how I know (or why do I believe) that *p*.

The obvious question to ask is why the burdens of epistemic responsibility should be so unevenly distributed? Why isn't there responsible (and irresponsible) *querying* as well as responsible (and irresponsible) believing? There is. The structure of permissions and obligations imposed by (PGS)/(CQA) is a serious distortion of our ordinary practices of claiming and attributing knowledge, which conform to a *Default and Query Structure (DQS)*:

(DQS) In some contexts and with respect to some claims, claimants possess and are properly granted default epistemic assertional entitlement: entitlement that does not depend on the claimant's doing or having done any *specific evidential work* or possessing any *citable reasons* for his commitment.

However, default entitlement can lapse. In particular, it can lapse in the face of failure to respond to a contextually appropriate epistemic query.

Epistemic queries come in two flavors. As Austin remarks, "How do you know?" and "why do you believe?" may be asked out of respectful curiosity, a genuine desire to learn. But they may also be asked *pointedly*, the implication being that perhaps I *don't* know or *shouldn't* believe.[xiii] In the latter case, such queries are *challenges* to my epistemic authority. In the former my interlocutor only wants an *explanation*. For example, he may want to know how I found out that *p* in order to acquire further *p*-related information. Here there is no challenge: knowledge is conceded. Nevertheless, queries of *both* types must be contextually appropriate and are thus themselves potential objects of epistemic querying. No epistemic query carries an automatic right to an answer. The proper response to a query may be a query.

In the case of a challenge, I may need (and thus be entitled) to ask "How do you think I may be going wrong? *What do you want to know*? If my interlocutor has no response, no concrete challenge has been entered: my epistemic standing remains untouched. The conditions for requesting an explanation may be more liberal, since there is no suggestion of a mistake on the part of the claimant. Even so, requests for explanations are not always in order. Suppose that we are both looking into my garden, and my dog wanders past, plainly visible to both of us. Having been wondering where he got to, I say "Oh, there's the dog." In these circumstances, your being in a position to concede *that* I know reflects your already knowing *how*. As a result, "How do you know?" would fail to ask a serious (or even an intelligible) question. (Or at least, there would need to be a lot more stage-setting for it to succeed in doing so.) The upshot is that there is no unfettered right to enter epistemic queries. The claim that merely by representing myself as knowledgeable I stand on the brink of a potentially infinite regress of justification is a myth.

It might be thought that everything I have just said is compatible with externalist-reliabilism. Indeed, why not take externalist reliabilism, with respect to basic cognitive capacities, as explaining the existence of at least a large class of default entitlements? To

an extent, I accept this point: much knowledge does arise from the unselfconscious exercise of basic cognitive capacities, and such knowledge often does involve default entitlement. I would go further: much knowledge must have this character. This is because we can only be accountable for our beliefs – can only be epistemic subjects at all – if we routinely get lots of things right in just this way. But this does not mean that we can be austere externalists with respect to this kind of routine knowledge, as Sosa proposes with respect to "animal" knowledge. For as I have argued, even in the case of such routine knowledge, we need more than reliable capacities and procedures: we need some *knowledge of how reliable they are*. In particular, we need some sense of our *limitations*. We need this knowledge to recognize the appropriateness of epistemic queries and to know how to respond appropriately to them. This knowledge may be largely implicit and practical: not separate from the way we handle epistemic questions but immanent in it. And of course, as Goldman insists, it is subject to empirical correction and expansion. This is another point on which we agree. Where we part company is that my account of knowledge – fully human knowledge – preserves an essential connection between *being justified* and *having the ability to justify*. However, being justified requires only being able to justify *when required*: that is, in the face of a contextually appropriate epistemic query: this is all that epistemic accountability entails. Much routine knowledge is not seriously or sometimes even intelligibly challengeable, giving it an "externalist" appearance. However, appearances are misleading.

So much for deontology. What about guidance? I have argued that knowledge-claims are appraisable in two dimensions: responsibility and reliability. Over time, our engagement with the world and with each other, in the context of epistemic practices governed by these twin constraints, shapes our beliefs. Suspicions of irresponsibility or unreliability are a potent source of epistemic challenges, thus a spur to belief-revision. In this way, the constraints of responsibility and reliability play a guiding role. But neither constraint has any essential connection with "guidance" if this is taken to involve constant self-conscious epistemic monitoring or decision-making.

We should reconsider the knowability constraint that Goldman takes follow from the GD conception of justification. Recall:

> (KJ) The only facts that qualify as justifiers of an agent's believing p at time t are facts that the agent can readily know, at t, to obtain or not to obtain.

Goldman sees this as a weak knowability constraint. But from my standpoint, it is still far too strong. There is no reason to suppose that, *at the time I came to know that p*, I had to be in a position to appraise the reliability (general or situational) of the procedure through which I obtained this knowledge. Generally speaking, attending to first-order matters is incompatible with pursuing epistemic inquiries. A challenge to the reliability of the epistemic procedure on the basis of which I take myself to know that p may trigger a *subsequent* investigation. My claim to knowledge will be sustained if the challenge can be dealt with at *that* time.

Goldman is right to repudiate the subjectivist internalism that has dominated so much traditional epistemology. But the case for repudiating internalism, understood as